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AGENCY AND ESCROW
ROGER K. GARRISON

There are myriad instances in the law where courts or legislatures of
various states have given precise definition to a certain legal status.
Such words as "trustee," "guardian," and "mortgagor" have come to
have fixed meanings and definite legal incidents attached to them. Not
so fortunate, however, has been the term "escrow holder," or sometimes "escrowee." While courts are generally in accord as to what circumstances will create an escrow transaction, statements of the precise
legal status of the escrow holder are noteworthy for their discord rather
than their harmony.
As yet no court has seen fit to regard the escrow holder as sui generis.
Courts persist in finding the legal incidents of the escrow holder's
status in terms of other concepts which have already been delineated.
This process ultimately leads to what has been called a "jurisprudence
of conceptions," a phenomenon which has been assailed as unsound.'
It is the purpose of this article to examine the plight of the escrow
holder with particular reference to a problem which has recently been
before the Washington Supreme Court no less than three times,
namely: upon whom does the loss fall when an escrow holder becomes
insolvent or absconds with the funds of an escrow transaction?
The first Washington case was Lieb v. Webster.' In that case the
escrow holder had the duty of procuring the title insurance on the property sold, and this duty was made a condition precedent to the vendor's
right to receive the money which had been paid in by the vendee. There
was probably a pure agency situation as to the title insurance, for it is
usually purchased by the vendor as his proof of a marketable title. The
title insurance had not been procured at the time the escrow holder
absconded with the funds of the transaction. The court held that since
it was clear that when the money was deposited by the vendee, the
escrow holder held it as agent for the vendee and there was no evidence
that this relation changed, the loss of the funds must fall on the vendee.
It appeared from the facts of the case that the escrow instructions of
the vendor were met by the vendee, and the vendee had paid the money
' Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision, 36 HARv. L. REV. 802, 817 (1923).
230 Wn.(2d) 43, 190 P.(2d) 701 (1948).
46
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over to the escrow holder in compliance with them "for the account of
the vendor." An argument could be made that the escrow holder held
the funds for the vendor at the time they were paid in. No previous
decision compelled the court to agree that the funds were held at the
time of deposit for the person who deposited them rather than for the
person to whom they were to be delivered. However, the fact that the
court chose the former position in preference to the latter, permits a
rationalization of the case on a theory other than "agency."
This alternative would be in terms of "ownership of the money." The
reasoning is that as a general proposition, when property is lost, the
loss must be borne by the person who owned it. The money in the Lieb
case was the property of the buyer at the time he paid it over to the
escrow holder, and it did not become the property of the seller until he,
the seller, was entitled to receive it. He was not entitled to receive it
until the conditions of the escrow which were placed on the disbursement of the money by the buyer were either met or excused. Therefore,
prior to the performance of the conditions imposed by the buyer, the
buyer bears the loss of his own money, and subsequent to this time the
seller bears the loss of his own money. The argument is strong that
after the performance of all the conditions the seller owns the money,
but it is not so clear that the buyer owns it prior to the performance of
the conditions, for he has lost some of the usual incidents of ownership,
e.g., right to possession and control. He has only the right to obtain the
performance of the seller and the possibility that the seller may default
and permit the buyer to demand return of the money. To find the buyer
the owner of the money after he has paid it in, one must argue negatively, i.e., he did own it; no one else has become the owner; therefore
he must still own if. This argument must of necessity depend upon the
dubious validity of the proposition that "ownership of the money"
must be in one party or the other and not in both concurrently.
The possibility must be always kept in mind that the use of agency
language does not necessarily mean a philosophic commitment to
agency principles. But the fact remains that in the Lieb case and its
sequels the court used agency language and it cannot be safely asserted
that they did not mean what they said. If the commitment to agency
is only verbal, there is the danger that this language may in the future
lead the court to apply agency principles, which as will be seen are
incompatible with the operation of the escrow device. It is interesting
to note that the rule used in the Lieb case to place the loss was actually
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an agreement of the parties as to what the law on that point was. The
court cites no authority and gives no affirmative indication that it
believes the rule to be correct.
The later case of Angell v. Ingram' involved a set of facts strikingly
similar to the Lieb case. The only way the appellant could prevail was
either to distinguish the Lieb case on its facts or attack its major
premise, the rule of law used. Counsel chose to do the former and
failed, the court saying at the outset of its opinion, "The parties agree
that the rule laid down in Lieb v. Webster is the one that must be
applied." This statement is ambiguous since it is not clear whether it
means that the court "laid down" the rule in the previous case, or that
the parties did not dispute the rule of the Lieb case, and so sheds little,
if any, light on the court's own position as to the rule of law used.
The possibility that the court would repudiate its previous use of
agency language and adopt some theory other than that of the principal's liability for the acts of his agent was definitely settled by Lechner v. Halling4 when it was said by the court, "As the trial court recognized, the rule to be applied in this type of case was laid down by this
court in Lieb v. Webster and reiterated in Angell v. Ingram." Thus it
appears that the court decided the third case on the basis of the first
two, the second on the basis of the first, and the first on the agreement
of counsel that the correct rule is stated in American Jurisprudence,5
which fact appears from the appellate briefs of both parties and the
statement in the appellant's brief that "the rule of law is not disputed
by the parties to this action."6
In the recent case of Schrock v. Gillingham7 the court made use of
the Lieb and Angell cases to support a holding that an embezzling real
estate agent brought the loss down on the person" for whom he was
acting. The case is not strictly germane to this discussion in that there
was no escrow agreement and the embezzler was not an escrow holder,
but a true agent. It is interesting however, in that it clearly demons135

Wash. Dec. 551, 213 P.(2d) 944 (1950).

4 135 Wash. Dec. 845, 216 P.(2d) 179 (1950).

519 Am. JUR., Escrows § 11. A portion of this section was quoted by counsel as
follows: "When an instrument has been delivered to a depositary as a writing or
escrow of the grantor, it does not become a deed, and no legal title or estate passes
until the condition has been performed or the event has happened upon which it is to
be delivered to the grantee .... The same rule is applied to the deposit of moneys with
an escrow agent in determining upon whom the loss falls when the escrow agent fails
... the courts holding that the title to the money depends upon whether the condition
under which the money had been deposited had been performed or not."
6 Appellant's brief p. 12.
7 136 Wash. Dec. 386, 219 P.(2d) 92 (1950).
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strates that the court sees no difficulty in applying the same rule to
both an escrow transaction and a true agency problem.
The cases discussed above reveal that whenever the loss was placed
on one party, it was so placed with reference to whether or not the conditions of the escrow agreement had been complied with. The question
of what conditions were important received an answer in the Lechner
case where it was said that in order to solve the problem of the identity
of the principal at the time of the loss "it is first necessary to determine
whether all the conditions which the vendee attached to the disbursement of the funds had been complied with prior to the delivery of the
deed and other instruments to them."' Restated, the rule is: the vendor
does not become the principal as to the money until such time as all
the conditions precedent to his right to receive the money have been
fulfilled. At first blush this seems to be inconsistent with the holding
in the Lieb case, for there all the things to be done by the vendor himself had been done. But a closer analysis shows that at the time the
escrow holder absconded there was still unperformed a condition precedent to the vendor's right to receive the money, to wit: the procurement
of title insurance by the escrow holder as agent of the vendor. Although
the court has not as yet discussed the merits of the rule, the fact that it
was essential to the holding in four cases makes it almost certain that
such is now the law of the state of Washington.
A further proposition bearing on the announced rule is that the fact
that there are conditions precedent to the vendee's right to receive the
documents of title seemingly will not prevent the vendor from becoming entitled to all or part of the funds deposited with the escrow holder.,
Further, it may be well to point out that under the announced rule, it
is possible for the vendor to become entitled to some of the money, but
not all of it, and thus cause each party to the transaction to bear a part
of the loss.10
It is essential to the utility of the rule that the point in time at which
the funds were lost be determined. The rule would seemingly be impossible to apply if this important fact were unsettled." The factors
s Lechner v. Hailing, 135 Wash. Dec. 845, 851, 216 P.(2d) 179, 184 (1950).

0 This proposition is implicit in the rule, in that the court is seemingly concerned
only with conditions precedent to the vendor's right to receive the money, and not the
vendee's right to receive the performance of the vendor.
10 Schrock v. Gillingham, 136 Wash. Dec. 386, 219 P. (2d) 92 (1950). This must
be qualified to the extent that the Schrock case did not involve escrows, although it was
treated as though it did.
11An extremely complex practical problem could arise in connection with this
aspect of the rule. For example, if an escrow holder was handling several transactions
at once (which is a common situation) and embezzlements took place over a period of
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involved in the solution to this collateral problem are, however, outside
the scope of this article. It is sufficient to say that in answer to the basic
inquiry of who bears the loss when the funds of an escrow transaction
are lost, the Washington court has so far said: (1) the person for whom
the escrow holder is holding the funds as agent bears the loss; (2)
which party is the principal as to the funds depends upon whether or
not the conditions of the escrow transaction have been met at the time
of the loss; (3) the important conditions are those precedent to the
vendor's right to receive the funds.
The Washington Supreme Court in using agency language in dealing
with the escrow holder, has fallen into step with a majority of courts
which have dealt with the problem. This, however, is not conclusive
proof that the application of a rule of agency law in a situation of this
sort is in all respects the most equitable mode of solution or that the
rule is easy to apply. The vice of the agency approach lies in the remote
and subtle distinctions which abound in the law of agency generally and
which have little appeal for either the lawyer or the layman. Especially
is this true when large losses are fastened on one of two equally innocent parties. The inconsistency of using agency rules, where it is convenient and abandoning them when it is not, gives some force to the
argument that they should not be used at all in escrow transactions.12
In discussions of theory it is often of value to see what the text
writers have to say. Walsh says that when a deed is delivered to an
escrow holder, the escrow holder holds it at that time for the person
to whom it is to be delivered." This is precisely the reverse of the
position taken by the Washington court and courts generally. Tiffany
criticizes the whole structure of escrow transactions, pointing out that
the purposes of the escrow transaction is to effect a conditional delivery
of a deed; that delivery is merely an expression by word or act that
the instrument have legal operation; that this is a matter of intent, and
the emphasis attached to the physical delivery of an instrument of
time, during which lesser sums were replaced and later removed, etc., it would be virtually impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy how much of a given fund
was embezzled at a given time.
12 An escrow holder has been held to be such an agent that his knowledge is imputed
to the grantor and grantee. Earley v. Owens, 109 Cal. App. 489, 293 Pac. 136 (1930) ;
Ryder v. Young, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 545, 50 P.(2d) 495 (1935). But it has been also
held that he is not enough of an agent that he can accept a check, admittedly good, in
lieu of the cash required by the contract. Thornhill v. Oleson, 31 N.D. 81, 153 N.W.
442 (1915). For a vivid illustration of the difficulty that can arise when knowledge is
imputed see Nelson v. Ashton-Jenkins Co., 66 Utah 351, 242 Pac. 408 (1925) ; Smith v.
Brown, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 492, 36 P.(2d) 1081 (1934).
13 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 214, p. 471 (1947).
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conveyance is a "relic of primitive formalism."' 4 Thompson says that
the escrow holder is the agent of both parties individually 5 but goes
to some length to distinguish between a delivery to an 16agent of the
grantor and a delivery to an escrow agent of the grantor.
It is submitted that agency rules as to the disposition of the loss are
only a makeshift-a mere device to settle a difficult problem. No one
has yet attempted to be consistent in the use of agency theory in this
area, and it could not be done. For example, if the grantor delivers an
instrument of conveyance in escrow he may not legally demand it back
within the time limit of the escrow,' 7 and if the grantor dies, the escrow
holder's "agency" is not terminated, 8 which demonstrates to some
extent at least that the escrowee is not an agent in the usual meaning
of the word. Further, there could never be an escrow if agency rules
were used normally, for if the grantor is the principal when he deposits
the instrument of conveyance he could demand it be returned to him
thus destroying the "delivery beyond the control of the grantor" which
is a requisite of a true escrow. If the escrow holdei is the agent of the
grantee, there is absolute delivery and the grantee takes free of the
conditions by virtue of the rule of delivery of a deed to an agent of
the grantee.' 9
In a case which has been generally overlooked, it was said by the
Kansas court:2"
A certain resemblance between the office of the agent and the office of depositary of an escrow lead us to speak of a depositary as an agent. We
immediately get into trouble, however, when we speak of a depositary as
the agent of the vendor to receive the purchase money and deliver the deed.
... Following the line of least resistance, we hasten to say that the depositary is not the agent of the vendor merely, but is the agent of both parties.
When, however, we undertake to found arguments upon and to draw conclusions from this application of the name "agent," we immediately get into
trouble.... The result is a depositary is always something more or something less than an ordinary agent, and accuracy permits us to say no more
than the depositary is an intermediary....
When the depositary steps outside the sphere of authority created
...
144 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1049 (3rd ed., Jones, 1939).
15 7 THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAw oF REAL PROPERTY § 4196

(Perm. ed., 1940).
26 7 Id. § 4197.
'17 W.SH, op. cit. supra note 13, § 214 n. 7.
'sAId., § 214 n. 9.

19 This rule as usually stated will be found in 7 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 15,

§ 4197.

20 Smith v. Griffith, 105 Kan. 357, 184 Pac. 725 (1919) ; see Nickell v. Reser, 143
Kan. 831, 57 P.(2d) 101 (1936).
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by the escrow agreement... he does not act as the agent of the party to the
escrow agreement whose rights are prejudiced by his conduct. Since his
powers are defined by the escrow agreement there can be no misconception
of them. Vendor and vendee deal with him in respect to the escrow at their
peril.... If he be guilty of a breach of duty in delivering, without payment
of the purchase money ... he is not the agent of the vendor in making the
misdelivery. (Italics supplied.)
This should be sufficient to demonstrate that a thoroughgoing application of agency law is incompatible with the recognized attributes of
the escrow holder. Some courts have recognized this difficulty with the
agency theory and have sought to solve it by placing a tag on the
escrow holder and making him "like" some other legal animal. Thus
the escrow holder has been called a "trustee,"'" but this can be dismissed summarily, as no title ever vests in him although there are situations where the escrow holder could be a trustee should the grantor
intend that he be one.22 The United States Supreme Court has called
the escrow holder a stakeholder." This terminology has been criticized
because it connotes a gambling transaction. 4 Whether or not this
criticism has merit depends upon one's personal devotion to the escrow
device. A more practical shortcoming would seem to be the fact that
the two terms are nearly synonymous and neither has been defined
separately. Therefore, to define one in terms of the other is meaningless. Seavey has suggested that the escrow holder might be considered
as being in the same position as an agent who has a power coupled
with an interest.2 '
In view of the varying terminology which has been used from time
to time which has as its purpose an avoidance of the problem or is
beset with the greater evil of self inconsistency, the most proper solution would seem to be to treat the escrowee as sui generis and have done
with attempts to define the relationship in terms already applied to
dissimilar situations. There is no conceptual difficulty in this approach;
it is only a matter of recognizing the escrow holder as an individual
whose status is unique in the law. It is the opinion of the writer that the
21 Farago v. Burke, 262 N.Y. 229, 186 N.E. 683 (1933); Feisthamel v. Cambell,
55 Cal. App. 774, 205 Pac. 25 (1921) ; Siebel v. Higham, 216 Mo. 121, 115 S.W. 987
(1908). In Squire v. Branciforti, 131 Ohio St. 344, 2 N.E. (2d) 878 (1936), a bank
which received funds as escrow holder and mingled them with other funds was held
to be a trustee of the money so that the parties to the escrow contract were entitled to
a preference when the bank closed its doors.
22 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 32(c) (1935).
2" Citizens National Bank v. Davisson, 229 U.S. 212 (1913), cited as authoritative
in Lyons v. Liberty National Bank, 65 F.(2d) 837 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
24 E. L. FARMER, ESCROWS 10 (1931).
25 SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 167 (1949).
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general rules of agency are so foreign to the practicalities of the escrow
device that they should not be used. A fortiori,the one aspect of agency
law that has been used when the escrow holder absconds with the funds
of an escrow transaction should also be abandoned. The "ownership of
the money" theory previously discussed as an alternative rationalization in the Lieb case brings one out with the same practical result as
an agency theory, so long as it is insisted that the total ownership be in
one party or the other. However, if this latter element of the argument
is abandoned, and co-ownership of the funds permitted, the practical
effect of an escrow holder absconding before the conditions of the
escrow had been completely performed would be to split the loss
between the parties to the transaction. It is submitted that this result
may be the desirable one, if the abstract justice of the situation is
regarded, and the legal niceties overlooked.
In the typical case there is little, if any, fault attributable to either
party alone, and neither should bear the whole loss. California, which
founded, in the leading case of Hilderbrand v. Beck,2 6 the rule used
by the Washington court, has voluminous dicta to the effect that at
least prior to the time the conditions of the escrow have been met the
escrow holder is the agent for both parties.2" One implication from
those cases is that the loss would be split when a defalcation of the
escrow holder occurred at this stage, as it did in both the Lieb and
Angell cases."s The cases, however, do not bear this out.
It does not seem inaccurate to say that both parties to an escrow
agreement have an interest in it as a whole, for each does have an
interest that will be protected in equity,2" and both are anxious that it
be carried through in the usual case, or they would not have contracted
in the first instance. Why then should one party bear the whole loss
when both are in complete good faith and the loss arises through the
26196 Cal. 141, 236 Pac. 301 (1925). See Note, 39 A.L.R. 1080 to the effect that the
Hilderbrand case is the first one on the exact point of who bears the loss when an
escrow agent absconds. This case is also the only square holding supporting the rule set
forth by 19 Am. JuR. Escrows § 11, relied on by the Washington court in the Lieb case
although not cited. See note 5, supra.The rule as stated in 30 C.J.S., Escrows § 9, n. 82
cites but one case not founded on the Hilerbrandcase which came to the same conclusion independently, namely, Foster v. Elswick 176 Ark. 974, 4 S.W. (2d) 946
(1928)
; accord, Crum v. City of Los Angeles, 110 Cal. App. 508, 294 Pac. 430 (1930).
2 7
Blackburn v. McCoy, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 648, 37 P. (2d) 153 (1934); New Port
Bay Dredging Co. v. Helm, 120 Cal. App. 127, 7' P. (2d) 1039 (1932) ; First National
Bank v. Caldwell, 84 Cal. App. 438, 258 Pac. 411 (1927) ; Shreeves v. Pearson, 194
Cal. 699, 230 Pac. 448 (1924) ; Feisthamel v. Campbell, 55 Cal. App. 774, 205 Pac. 25
(1921).
28 uRaBY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 402 (1943).
29 Feisthamel v. Cambell, 55 Cal. App. 774, 205 Pac. 25 (1921); WALSH, op. cit.
supra note 13 § 214.
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fault of a third person who by definition must be a stranger to the
parties?
No harm and much good could come from a re-examination of the
escrow holder's status when the opportunity next presents itself to the
Washington court. No principle of justice requires that a heavy loss be
cast upon one of two equally innocent parties. It is possible that legislative action could in part cure the hardship that results when an
escrowee absconds with the funds of an escrow transaction. Nearly
every one who has access to public funds is bonded, often in very large
amounts. This prudent practice extends from bank presidents (statutory)"0 down the scale to sales clerks (good sense). The Washington
court has endorsed such measures"' and the California Code requires
it, 2 although the amount seems inadequate.

30 REM. REV. STAT.

§ 3239 [P.P.C. § 309-35].

31 Lieb v. Webster, 30 Wn.(2d) 43, 50, 190 P.(2d) 701, 705 (1948).
32 Cal. Laws 1947, c. 921 [Deering's California Code, Vol. I § 2365].

